Certainty, Belief, and Rationality by McCormick, Peter
Peter McCormick 
Certainty, Belief, and Rationality *
[On the Lockean view] rationality is above all a property of the process of 
thinking, not of the substantive content of thought.
Charles Taylor
Those who say that Reason, in Locke, is purely procedural, not substantive,
cannot have read Book TV. 
Nicholas W olterstorff
... why then
have to be human -  and, escaping from fate, 
keep longing for fate? 
R. M. Rilke
1. Modernist Subjectivism
The m ajor developm ent of m odern culture has m odernism  in the arts 
at its center.1 This developm ent, although a »many-faceted movement,« the 
Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, wants to call »subjectivation.« Sub- 
jectivation represents the move away from different norms and criteria seen 
as fundam entally independen t from hum an beings to those that are funda­
mentally dependen t on the choices of individual hum an subjects.
The movement of subjectivation has two major elements -  one concerns 
the conten t o f hum an action and the other the manner. Yet such a distinc­
tion invites confusion because each elem ent can be taken as self-referential 
in the same way. Thus, one can easily incline to the view that, ju st as the
* Copyright © 1998 by Peter J. McCormick. All rights reserved.
1 See C. Taylor, The Ethics of Ambiguity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
Chapter Eight, »Subtler Languages,« pp. 81-91. Some of Taylor’s more recent thoughts 
can be found  in his replies to  a series of critical papers about his various positions. 
SeeJ. Tully, ed., Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). See also Taylor’s recent papers, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
MA: H arvard University Press, 1995), esp. pp. vii-xii.
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m anner in which I effect any one o f my actions is necessarily m ine in the 
sense that it cannot but refer to my ways o f acting, so too the m atter or con­
tent of my actions must similarly refer to my goals o r aims or whatever. The 
consequence of holding such a view comes to no th ing  m ore than the »ram­
pant subjectivism« that characterizes m uch of the m odernist period.2 And 
this subjectivism Taylor sees in turn as the root o f both »instrum ental rea­
son and the ideologies of self-centered fulfillment« in so m uch contem po­
rary reflection.3
In this paper I would like to examine critically Taylor’s extended views 
with the hopes of clarifying our understandings o f the seminal m om ents in 
the m odern understandings of certainty.
Now, there is more than one kind of self-referentiality at work in this 
picture of m odern subjectivism. While granting that the m anner of o n e ’s 
actions indeed refers necessarily to o n e ’s own ways o f perform ing actions, 
to one’s ownaims, desires, aspirations, or whatnot, Taylor argues that the 
m atter o f those actions need not. For one may ju st as well cen ter the con­
ten t of o n e ’s actions on matters that owe their significance to som ething 
outside or beyond or independent o f o n e ’s own interests. So subjectivism 
represents only one of the two kinds of subjectivation which, however easily 
confused, are nonetheless different.
Taylor goes on to advance a second and m ore substantial claim, this 
time not about the two main features of subjectivation but about m odern 
art in general and m odernist poetry in particular. W ithout this distinction, 
Taylor thinks, one cannot understand either. »... the two kinds o f subjectiva­
tion have to be distinguished,« he writes, »if we are to understand m odern 
art.«4 And to justify this claim Taylor turns to Rilke, to the very well-known 
opening of the first of the Duino elegies, »Who, if I cried out, would hear 
me am ong the angels’ /  hierarchies?«5
In o rder to understand what Rilke has in m ind here in talking o f »an­
gels,« one has to see that the m eaning o f this crucial word, unlike say Mil­
ton ’s use o f the same word, cannot be established by any reference to »cer­
tain publicly available orders of meaning« such as »a medieval treatise on 
the ranks of cherubim and seraphim.«6 For the m odernist period charac­
teristically lacks such agreed-upon, entirely external, public reference points.
2 C. Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1989), p. 491.
3 Taylor 1992, p. 90.
4 Taylor 1992, p. 89.
5 Rilke, p. 151.
г' Taylor 1992, p. 84.
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Just as Baudelaire wrote about correspondences without anyone in his cul­
ture, unlike anyone in the Renaissance era, believing any more in the exist­
ence of such things, so too Rilke writes of angels without anyone in his cul­
ture, unlike anyone in the Medieval period, believing any more in such 
doctrines.
Consequently, in o rder to understand Rilke’s use of a word like »an­
gels,« one m ust forego any appeal to strongly external canons. Instead, we 
m ust work ou t the specific details of how Rilke uses this word in the chang­
ing constellations of his own poetic practices. Rilke’s m eaning here is most 
directly tied to Rilke’s language not to the cosmos. Thus, understanding 
Rilke’s m eaning entails understanding his uses of language.7
We may say accordingly that a strong contrast holds between an under­
standing of interpretation, an externalist interpretation, that derives its basic 
canons from outside a particular hum an sensibility, and an internalist inter­
pretation, one that does not. This second kind of interpretation is requisite 
for understanding much m odernist poetry including Rilke’s. »Rilke’s ‘order’ 
can become ours only through being ratified afresh in the sensibility of each 
new reader. In these circumstances, the very idea that once such an order 
should be em braced to the exclusion of all the others -  a dem and that is 
virtually inescapable in the traditional context -  ceases to have any force« 
(86-87).
This distinction between internalist and externalist interpretation can 
now be linked with an earlier claim of Taylor’s, namely that Rilke’s poetry 
can be construed paradoxically as a non-subjective subjectivism. The poet­
ry is subjective in the sense that it can exhibit a subjectivation of manner, 
yet no t subjective in the sense that it does not entail a subjectivation of matter 
o r content. Indeed, as the »thing poems« in Rilke’s earlier New Poems show, 
m uch o f Rilke’s poetry is n o t subjective in content at all.8 The apparent 
paradox then in the passage from Rilke’s Ninth Elegy, where the poet seems
7 »What could never be recovered,« Taylor summarizes, »is the public understanding 
that angels are p art of a hum an-independent ontic order, having their angelic natures 
quite independently  o f hum an articulation, and hence accessible through languages 
o f disruption (theology, philosophy) that are not at all those of articulated sensibility« 
(p. 89).
8 Relying on studies of Rom antic poetry, Taylor summarizes his general view here in a 
phrase: »where formerly poetic language could rely on certain publicly available orders 
o f m eaning, it now has to consist in a language of articulated sensibility« (84). For 
Rilke’s New Poems from  1907 and  1908 see the translations by E. Snow in two volumes 
(North P oint Press, San Francisco 1984 and 1987 respectively). See also the less 
familiar b u t closely related  poem s from  1899 to 1906 in Rilke’s The Book of Images, tr. 
E. Snow, revised edition (N orth Point Press, San Francisco 1994).
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to exhibit at the same time both a subjectivism tout court and a subjectivism 
that after all is non-subjective -  this paradox dissolves. The passage is first 
in terpreted  internally as exhibiting a subjectivity in m anner but no t in con­
tent. But, while the m anner of expression necessarily refers to the subjec­
tive sensibility of the poet, the conten t o f these expressions refers, at least 
partly, to something external to the poet’s sensibility. Correspondingly, the 
passage is then in terpreted externally.
The something external we may identify as we see fit, either with the 
»things« the passage mentions, or »the Earth« which the passage apostro­
phes, or »the world« in some more elusive sense. The essential point remains 
that the nature of the epiphany Taylor takes this passage to celebrate is no t 
exclusively a function of »our action,« but o f »a transaction between our­
selves and the world« (1989: 482).
O ne final point needs m entioning. The distinction between two kinds 
of self-reference enables Taylor to discrim inate within the general m odern 
movement of subjectivation two different species of subjectivism, one closed 
the o ther open. More fundamentally however, the present distinction de­
rives from a still larger view. For Taylor thinks that the m ovem ent o f subjec­
tivation that characterizes m odern culture is part of a major shift at the end 
of the eighteenth-century from representation to creation. »The change ... 
here goes back to the end of the eighteenth century,« Taylor writes, »and is 
related to the shift from an understanding o f art as mimesis to one that stress­
es creation... . it concerns what one m ight call the languages of art, that is, 
the publicly available reference points that, say, poets and painters can draw 
on... . But for a couple of centuries now we have been living in a world in 
which these points of reference no longer hold for us« (82-83).
The movement of subjectivation then is seen as flowing from a prior 
m om ent when a crucial shift takes place in the accessibility of the m ajor 
points of reference for attempts to in terp re t poetry and works o f art. More 
specifically, Taylor wants to interpret m odernist poetry, as here in his inter­
pretation of Rilke’s paradox of subjectivism, with the help of a general view 
on m odern culture from the standpoint of what he calls subjectivation. But 
that movement cannot be understood without explicitating its connection 
with a radical shift at the end of the eighteenth century.
I would like now to situate more precisely ju st what Taylor takes to be 
the source of subjectivation. I will go on to show that, pace Taylor, this source 
can be located in a certain understanding  o f the Lockean framework of 
belief.
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2. From Procedural to Instrumental Rationality
W hat drives this philosophical interpretation of representative m odern­
ist poetry like Rilke’s poetry o f suffering derives from an antecedent story 
about the characteristically subjectivist orientation of the m odern period. 
But just when this new story begins is not clear.
At times Taylor clearly suggests, as we have just noted, that the m od­
ern  period begins with the late eighteenth-century shift from an aesthetics 
o f representation to one of creativity. This comes to specifying the Roman­
tic era as the starting point for the m odern period. But Taylor speaks at other 
times o f the m odern  period beginning with Cartesian philosophy and sci­
ence. H ere the shift is from  late medieval, scholastic views, some of which 
are still operative in Descartes’s work, to the early m odern views that crys­
tallize in the seventeenth-century scientific revolutions. In this case Taylor 
construes the shift mainly in the epistemological terms of a change in the 
understanding of reason.
At first glance then  we seem to have a strong inconsistency in account­
ing for the em ergence o f the m odern period. But we need to recognize here 
a certain complexity. For Taylor is concerned to specify not ju st the emer­
gence of any one thing called »the modern period.« He explicitly rejects any 
claims to be attem pting e ither historical explanation or intellectual histo­
ry.1- Rather, he is at work on discriminating different strands within the com­
plicated story of modernity. For one of these strands, the Cartesian m om ent 
is param ount; for another, the Romantic m om ent -  two strands then and 
not two stories.
In trying to understand ju st which strand is param ount in these views 
about the m odern period as a movement of a double subjectivation that flows 
from the end of the eighteenth-century, we need to see that late eighteenth 
century m om ent itself against the major background of Locke’s philosophy. 
For, im plicated in this m ajor strand in the m odern period is a particular 
understanding o f reason and rationality. And this understanding is indissol­
ubly tied to a new notion of the self, »the ungrounded ‘extra-worldly’ states 
o f the objectifying subject« (1989: 175).
This idea of the self as, in some strong senses, disengaged and separat­
ed from the world, is taken to be characteristic of the m odern period. For 
in the m odern period the self is understood mainly in ju st these terms. The 
shift to the m odern then is no t to be described in terms of mimesis and cre­
ativity. Rather, the shift concerns the nature of reason itself. In particular, 
the shift is from  »the hegem ony of reason as a vision of cosmic order to the
9 Cf. Taylor 1989, pp. 202, 305.
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notion of a disengaged punctual subject exercising instrum ental control.«10 
And this is why Taylor sees the conflation o f the m anner and m atter o f sub­
jectivation leading to a reduction of reason to its instrumental and functional 
capacities only. In other words, instrum ental reason is »the kind o f ration­
ality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means 
to a given end.«11
Taylor describes at some length the beginnings o f the m odern period 
in the Lockean terms of an em ergent understanding o f the »punctual self« 
and its exercise of reason. The key elem ent in this story is, o f course, its 
continuity with the »procedural notion of rationality« that Taylor has already 
linked earlier to Descartes’s notion of a »disengaged subject.« With the shift 
however from subject to self, a corresponding shift ensues from procedural 
to instrum ental notions of reason and rationality. The question is how to 
specify the nature of this second shift.
The procedural notion of reason and rationality linked to the disen­
gaged subject is taken as the major result of a converging series o f histori­
cal studies on the spread of neo-Stoical disciplinary ideals to different types 
of seventeenth-century institutions. W hat these studies have brought into 
focus »is the growing ideal of a hum an agent who is able to rem ake him self 
by methodical and disciplined action. W hat this comes to is the ability to take 
an instrum ental stance to one’s given properties, desires, inclinations, ten­
dencies, habits of thought and feeling, so that they can be worked on, do­
ing away with some and strengthening others, until one meets the desired 
specifications. «12
This notion of the disengaged subject becomes, through the practices 
of instrum ental reason, a procedural self. And this procedural self is the 
»familiar m odern figure« who gains control through progressively objecti­
fying successive domains by neutralizing their antecedent normative claims. 
W hat comes to define rationality in this picture is the idea of a self that prac­
tices correct methods or procedures for constructing beliefs and attaining 
knowledge (162-63). The picture is Lockean.
The Lockean picture of reason and rationality, as Taylor wants us to 
understand the matter, is then a radicalization of the Cartesian procedural 
notion into an instrumental one. Citing different sections of Locke’s Essay, 
Taylor argues that Locke does far m ore than simply reject some of the un­
derlying epistemological assumptions of Cartesian rationalism such as innate 
ideas. Rather, Locke goes on to articulate a »profoundly anti-teleological view
10 Taylor 1989, p. 174.
11 Taylor 1992, p. 5.
12 Taylor 1989, pp. 159-160.
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of hum an nature, o f both knowledge and morality« (164-65). And he does 
so largely by carrying out his self-described tasks of clearing away, as he writes 
m emorably in the Epistle, »the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge,« 
of dem olition, and, only then, reconstruction.
The key to this articulation is Locke’s adoption of an atomistic theory 
of the m ind. U nderstanding is based upon the »quasi-mechanical« process 
of assembling the inert im prints left on the mind by the senses, »the build­
ing blocks o f simple ideas,« by processes of association into complex ideas. 
This process enables the independen t self to reconstruct a reliable and 
sound foundation for beliefs. This is the picture of the self refusing to con­
tem plate things bu t assuming responsibility and authority to construct ra­
tional beliefs and knowledge. O n this view, Taylor writes, »rationality is above 
all a property of the process of thinking, not of the substantive content of 
thought« (168).
More specifically, Locke takes rationality as a process of thought in the 
sense that rationality m ust be essentially understood from a first-person and 
not from  a third-person standpoint. The rational self is one that self-reflex- 
ively disengages from »spontaneous beliefs and syntheses, in order to sub­
m it them  to scrutiny. This is something which in the nature of things each 
person m ust do for himself« (168). So reason and rationality acknowledge 
no o ther authority than that o f the not ju st disengaged subject but of the 
thoroughly independent, objectifying, anti-teleological self.
This disengagem ent, moreover, is radically linked to the self-reflexive- 
ness that issues in self-objectification. The self-objedification is what allows 
of the piecemeal yet progressive reformulation of both habits of belief and 
habits o f action. And this reformulation in turn leads to a self-reformulation 
that is a self-creation, a self-identification no longer with habits but with the 
process o f objectification (171).
Both belief and action are now articulated with a sharp and unyield­
ing focus no t on »relations o f natural fact« but on connections that »are 
determ ined purely instrumentally, by what will bring the best results, pleas­
ure, or happiness« (171). The basic link is thus forged between an idea of 
the self as a pure »detachable consciousness« existing »nowhere but in this 
power to fix things as objects« (172), and an idea of reason and rationality 
that consists n o tju st in the exercise of current procedures but in the instru­
mental and functional constructions of objectifications. And this is the strand 
o f radical self-reflexivity that is woven together with others to initiate, on 
Taylor’s view, the m odern period.
Locke will go on to nuance the relations between instrum ental and 
procedural understandings o f rationality. Two major areas of course are
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those of morality and natural theology. And m uch attention needs direct­
ing to the connections between Lockean deism and the developm ent o f the 
Enlightenment. In theology, for example, Locke will no t only reject origi­
nal sin; he will put reason rather than faith at the center of things. But then  
Locke will claim that »instrumental rationality, properly conducted, is of the 
essence of our service of God« (243). H ere however the distinctive relation 
between procedural and the more radical instrum ental rationality we have 
seen at work in the epistemology is somewhat blurred.
Thus Taylor seems to go back on his earlier distinction when he writes 
in a theological context, »the rationality in question is now procedural: in 
practical affairs, instrumental; in theoretical, involving the careful, disen­
gaged scrutiny of our ideas and their assembly according to the canons of 
mathematical deduction, and empirical probability« (243). But this foun­
dation, when taken over into the larger epistemological and metaphysical 
contexts of Locke’s quarrels with Descartes, is no t sharp enough to capture 
Locke’s radical differences with Descartes. To do so we need the idea o f a 
radicalization of the procedural reason of the disengaged Cartesian subject 
into the instrumental rationality of the autonom ous and objectifying Lock­
ean self, »the new stance,« as Taylor himself puts it later on, »which Descartes 
inaugurates and Locke intensifies« (177).
One now apparent gap in this story is the role of M ontaigne’s reflec­
tions specifying the beginnings of the m odern era. Despite his great emphasis 
on Descartes and Locke, Taylor does no t overlook Montaigne. But however 
different in their understandings o f reason and rationality, Descartes and 
Locke are for Taylor part of one strand only in the em ergence of the m od­
ern. And that strand unwinds from their opposition mainly to Platonic and 
later versions of Neo-platonism but also to Aristotelian philosophies. This 
opposition is what unites Descartes and Locke in their related but different 
attempts to articulate specific senses o f reason’s autonom y from nature and 
God in an expanded notion of the subject and the self.
Despite his similar concerns with subjectivity and the tu rn  inward, 
M ontaigne is part of a separate strand. For M ontaigne needs to be under­
stood as part of the Augustinian world view rather than in opposition to 
Platonic notions of form or Aristotelian conceptions of nature. The Greek 
heritage o f Montaigne is new scepticism; but the even greater influence is 
the Augustinian models of inwardness -  a self-exploration ra ther than a dis­
engagem ent from the self. M ontaigne’s is then a different form of self-re- 
flexivity than that of either Descartes or of Locke. »Rather than objectify­
ing our own nature and hence classifying it as irrelevant to our identity,« 
Taylor writes, »it [this stance of radical reflexivity] consists in exploring what
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we are in o rder to establish this identity, because the assumption behind 
m odern self-exploration is that we d o n ’t already know who we are« (178).
Interestingly, Taylor sees this second strand at the origins of the mod­
ern  finding expression in some of Rilke’s work also. For the move to self­
exploration in M ontaigne issues in an experience of inner instability, uncer­
tainty, and im perm anence. And this exposure in turn give rise to »an accept­
ance o f limits.« However different the spirit of this acceptance -  in Mon­
taigne’s case Christian and Epicurean, in Rilke’s perhaps neo-Lucretian and 
almost pagan -  Taylor interprets passages from Rilke’s Second Elegy about 
the figures on the Attic gravestones in the terms of such an acceptance.
Rem em ber the hands,
how weightlessly they rest,though there is power in the torsos.
These self-mastered figures know: »We can go this far,
this is ours, to touch one another this lightly; the gods
can press down harder upon us. But that is the gods’ affair.«13
Nevertheless, the spirit o f M ontaigne’s self-exploration differs strong­
ly from that of the self-disengagement of Descartes and Locke.
Taylor sees this difference as one of both aim and m ethod. For, unlike 
Descartes’s, the aim of M ontaigne’s self-exploration is »to identify the indi­
vidual in his or her unrepeatable difference, where Cartesianism gives us a 
science o f the subject in its general essence; and it proceeds by a critique of 
first-person self-interpretations, rather than by proof of impersonal reason­
ing ... its aim is no t to find an intellectual order by which things in general 
can be surveyed, bu t ra ther to find the modes of expression which will al­
low the particular no t to be overlooked« (182). The one strand at the be­
ginning o f the m odern then is, as we have seen, one of radical disengage­
m ent; the other, and very different, strand in M ontaigne is one, just as rad­
ical, o f »engagem ent in our particularity.«
Thus, without slighting M ontaigne’s role at the outset of the m odern 
era, Taylor insists on emphasizing the other strand o f »radical reflexivity,« 
the strand of disengagem ent of the subject in Descartes and the atomiza­
tion of the self in Locke. For this is the strand that gives major form to both 
the inchoative m odern ideas o f reason and rationality.
3. The Origins of the Modern and the Transformation of the Self
This detailed and persuasive picture of the emergence of the m odern 
era in Locke’s transform ations of the Cartesian idea of a disengaged subject
13 Rilke, pp. 158-61; cited in Taylor 1989, p. 346.
61
Peter McCormick
whose rationality is mainly procedural to a punctual self whose rationality 
is mainly instrumental is not the only picture contem porary philosophers 
have developed. Indeed, Taylor’s own view is controversial. Consider a re­
cent, largely implicit critique of Taylor’s picture and especially the alterna­
tive picture o f the origins of m odernity that generates this critique.
In »Tradition, Insight and Constraint,« his 1992 Presidential Address 
to the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association,14 N icho­
las W olterstorff carries several steps further a reading of the origins o f the 
m odern era on which he has been at work for some years. The basis of this 
reading is an argued rejection of H egel’s understanding o f the genesis of 
modernity. And Hegel’s view, when filtered through the work of Max We­
ber on the transformation of a religious view of the world into a disenchant­
m ent from which both strongly differentiated social and cultural spheres 
have em erged,15 is Taylor’s inspiration for constru ing  the origins o f the 
m odern in terms of a transformation in the notion o f the self.
Taylor’s earlier works on Hegel, W olterstorff thinks, strongly support 
this genealogy. For there Taylor first expounds H egel’s ideas, especially in 
the Philosophy of Right and Lectures on the History of Philosophy, that the »mo­
dernity« of m odern philosophy is to be understood in terms of the central 
role of subjectivity in m odern philosophy. And this role is inaugurated in 
Descartes’s articulation of a new conception o f the subject that breaks with 
the previous era.10 Taylor centers this Hegelian story on the idea that Des­
cartes’s new subject is best understood no t with respect to the putative con­
nections between the subject and an external cosmic order, bu t as a »self- 
defining subject.«17
Descartes’s cogito thus conceals a radically new idea of the self as in­
dependent of any connection with the freshly discovered causal contingen­
cies of the cosmic order, the m odern self as self-defining subject. And, as we 
have already seen, it is this construal o f the Cartesian self-defining subject 
with its associated ideas of reason and rationality that, according to Taylor 
if not Hegel, Locke radicalizes as a punctual self incorporating no tju st pro­
cedural bu t instrumental notions o f reason and rationality.
14 Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Association, 66 (Novem ber 1992), 43-57. Cf. 
W olterstorff s distinction between Locke’s »descriptive epistemology« of knowledge 
and his »regulative epistemology« of belief in his »Lockean Philosophy of Religion,« 
in V. Chappell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke (Cam bridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1994), pp. 184-5.
15 W olterstorff, pp. 55-57.
16 Cf. W olterstorff’s citations from Hegel, p. 55.
17 See Taylor 1989, p. 6; cited in Wolterstorff, p. 55. F urther references in the text are to 
the W olterstorff article.
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Now W olterstorff concedes that taking the critical measure of the many 
complexities in such a story, only summarized here very briefly, would in­
volve a very extended discussion. In his most recent comments he confines 
him self to indicating one m ajor line of argum ent only. W olterstorff thinks 
Taylor »has lum ped together two quite different ideas in his notion of the 
self-defining subject. O ne is the idea of the will as central to the self, the other 
is the idea of the self as autonom ous« (55).
W olterstorff objects here not to the idea that subjectivity is character­
istic of both societies in the m odern era and the m odern philosophies which 
to some degree are their reflections. Rather, he contests Taylor’s Hegelian 
view that, since this philosophical shift occurs in Descartes’s work, Descartes’s 
work marks the origins o f the m odern. »I submit,« he writes, »that the self 
was no t yet the  center of attention in Descartes’s philosophy, neither the 
volitional self no r any other... . Descartes’s project was the practice and 
grounding of scientia« (56). When viewed from the perspective of Descartes’s 
own project, the central work was not, pace Hegel, the Meditations on First 
Philosophy, especially Meditation Two, but the Principles of Philosophy. Far from 
being the crucial figure in the genesis of the m odern, Descartes is »a transi­
tional figure« whose project, whatever features we now take as m odern, was 
no t distinctively m odern« (53) .1S
The basic justification Wolterstorff offers for this unconventional read­
ing is that the historical, cultural, and theological contexts of Descartes’s era, 
its pervasive and growing »cultural anxiety« that W olterstorff sees as mark­
ing the beginnings of that era in which we ourselves still live, »goes virtually 
unacknowledged in Descartes« (53). More specifically, »the fact that these 
cataclysmic events at the founding of modernity go almost unacknowledged 
in his philosophy,« W olterstorff argues, »indicates that the project in which 
he was engaged did not call for their acknowledgement« (53). Thus, very 
m uch like Toulm in’s careful reflections on the social and theological con­
texts of the shift from the humanistic revolution of the 1580’s to the scien­
tific revolutions of the 1640’s, W olterstorff insists on making room for his­
tory.
As the Latin text of his writings with their repetition of the crucial terms 
shows, Descartes’s project was the construction of scientia by starting »with 
certitude and by dem onstrative inference [to] arrive at certitude« (53). 
W hatever the m odern in terest in Descartes’s therapy of doubt versus the 
medieval »dialectical appropriation of the textual tradition« as a way of car­
rying out the project of scientia, »nothing at all of modernity is reflected in
18 T he poin t may be ironic when we recall the similar strategy Taylor adopted  with 
respect to M ontaigne.
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his reason« for recom mending this therapy (54). Scientia, its grounding and 
its construction, remains the center o f Descartes’s project no t the doubting 
subject.
The subject as the self, as W olterstorff sees things, is indeed  at the ori­
gins of the m odern. But these origins are no t to be located in Descartes’s 
philosophical projects but in those of Locke. »Only when we come to Locke,« 
W olterstorff writes, »does the self occupy center stage« (56).
This self however is taken not as the autonom ous self bu t as »the de­
ciding self,« the deciding subject whose cen ter is volition no t autonomy. 
»There is no t a whiff in Locke of the autonom ous self. O f the deciding self, 
there is much; of the autonom ous self, nothing. The reality with which our 
Reason puts us in touch is a reality laced through with m eaning, for it is a 
reality [for Locke’s Puritan vision] created by God and under the law o f God. 
It is when that conviction decays in philosophers after Locke, that the no­
tion of the self as autonom ous emerges« (56).
So Wolterstorff contests Taylor’s claims that Descartes’s understanding 
of the subject marks the beginnings o f the m odern on the grounds of the 
nature  o f rational understanding , its ro le in D escartes’s philosophical 
project, and the lack of any intrinsic connection between that philosophi­
cal project and its cultural contexts. By contrast, his alternative claim is that 
Locke’s project arises directly out of the need  to fashion a philosophical 
response to the cultural anxieties of his time. T hat project places the self at 
the center, and construes the self and its a ttendan t conceptions of reason 
and rationality not, pace Taylor, as autonom ous and self-defining, bu t as 
volitional only.
»My case for Locke as the first o f the great m odern  philosophers,« 
Wolterstorff summarizes, »is based on the claim that he was the first to ad­
dress himself head on to this anxiety [i. e., »the breaking apart of the moral 
and religious traditions of Europe into warring, partisan fragments«] at the 
founding of modernity. It is this that m ade him place the volitional self on 
center stage. The growing disenchantm ent o f the world would lead yet lat­
er philosophers to make of that volitional self an autonom ous self. Only then 
does the self in m odern philosophy becom e a self-defining self« (57).
4. Lockean Belief and Substantive Reason
Now, if these are the main lines in a recent critique of a contem porary 
Hegelian reading of the genesis of the m odern, what are the salient details 
of W olterstorff’s own reading of Locke? How does W olterstorff justify his 
counter-claims not so much about Descartes, bu t about Locke, specifically
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his claim that Locke no t Descartes centerstages the self no t as autonom ous 
but as volitional only?10
W olterstorff reads Locke’s philosophy as fundamentally responsive to 
the pervasive »cultural anxiety« of his times. This anxiety was the new and 
widespread incapacity to resolve religious, political, and moral quandaries 
at a time of radical historical revolutions. And this incapacity itself is seen 
to follow from the outspoken disavowal of the efficacy o f the medieval dia­
lectical appropriation of both texts and traditions for resolving conflicts of 
such large extent.
N either individuals no r societies, in Locke’s view, could turn any long­
er to texts and traditions for the resolution of their deepest problems. »The 
practices which European hum anity had cultivated for resolving its moral 
and religious quandaries,« W olterstorff writes, »had proved profoundly 
unsatisfactory: the textual tradition was fractured and seen as fractured, and 
scriptural interpretation was riven with controversy« (49-50). These were the 
basic contexts of Locke’s philosophy. In responding to these contexts, Locke 
inaugurates the m odern.
The basic issue at stake in the anxieties of the times, as Locke under­
stood the matter, came to the question of how one was to form one’s most 
fundam ental beliefs in a reliable way for grounding one’s life rationally at a 
time of such fragm entation and strife when both appeals to tradition and 
reappropriation o f texts were rightly discredited. »How are we to go about 
form ing our beliefs, especially on matters of morality and religion, when the 
old way has been rendered  irrelevant« (45)? Locke’s response was to formu­
late a philosophical project centered on »overcoming« the profound cul­
tural anxieties of his own times.
T hat project, on W olterstorff s as well as Taylor’s reading, was essentially 
epistemological. But, unlike Taylor, Wolterstorff sees the governing idea here 
as a radically novel »proposal for a new practice of belief-formation, a new 
doxastic practice -  no t only, though especially, on moral and religious mat­
ters« (45). Much more specifically, Locke’s new doxastic practice was a »foun- 
dationalist procedure -  for doing one’s best to bring it about, for proposi­
tions which one does no t know, that one believes them if and if only if they 
are true« (49).
The key to this reading o f Locke’s epistemology as a foundationalist 
procedure ra the r than ju s t a foundationalist criterion for warranting or
111 See especially N. W olterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief ( Cambridge University 
Press, Cam bridge 1996), pp. 227-246, and his Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections 
on the Claim that God Speaks (Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge 1995), pp. 261- 
266.
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entitling reliable beliefs is a very sharp focus on Book IV of Locke’s Essay, 
especially on the end of Book IV. By contrast, in developing his reading of 
Locke’s »quasi-mechanistic« epistemology, Taylor relies almost exclusively, 
as most contem porary philosophers still do, on Book II. For, while referring 
to The Epistle, Book I and even Book IV, Taylor centers his own account on 
Book II.
But W olterstorff argues persuasively that the aim of the Essay is to pro­
vide the details of Locke’s proposal for a new doxastic procedure. And these 
details, after the endless preparations, Locke provides in Book IV only where 
he specifies the nature of belief form ation and especially its governance. 
Moreover, these details come at the end of Book IV once Locke has shown 
that, unlike belief, genuine knowledge is »short and scanty« (cited in W 45). 
So Locke’s epistemology is not only a response to the cultural anxieties of 
his times; it is mainly a m atter of providing an analysis of procedures for 
ensuring the proper governance of belief form ation rather than an analysis 
of the nature of knowledge itself. His epistemology thus is mainly a regula­
tive epistemology of belief rather than a descriptive epistemology o f knowl­
edge.
In Book IV, knowledge while related to belief is very im portantly dis­
tinct from belief. Knowledge is direct awareness o f facts. These facts are ideas 
which are »directly present to the mind.« And the awareness, insight into, 
and apprehension of the »connection and agreem ent, or disagreem ent and 
repugnancy, among one’s ideas« is knowledge.
Belief on the other hand does not consist in direcdy apprehending facts 
but in »taking some proposition to be true« (47). Belief may accom pany 
knowledge, but need not. » ... belief is often present where knowledge is 
lacking. And even when belief does accompany knowledge [this is the nor­
mal situation], it remains distinct from  it. Taking a proposition to be true is 
distinct from apprehending some fact« (47).
Knowledge for Locke rem ains very limited. And that is because the 
familiar difficulties with his very narrow construal o f knowledge -  difficul­
ties with memory, for example, which show that some knowledge is o f facts 
of which we are not presently aware -  »forces Locke to choose between fac­
tual awareness and certitude of belief as definitive o f knowledge, and he 
chooses certitude of belief« (46). The result is that there are few facts o f 
which we can have knowledge in this sense of certain belief. Consequently, 
the Cartesian project of scientia is radically circum scribed — «some pure 
mathematics, some pure ethics, some logic; bu t no scientia o f nature« (46). 
Yet the compensation for this strictly lim ited scope of knowledge is the far
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larger scope of belief. Thus, for Locke, where we lack knowledge, as in most 
of the spheres of life, we are to rely on beliefs.
But o f course belief has its own difficulties. Wolterstorff summarizes 
these difficulties succinctly. »Some knowledge, on Locke’s official definition, 
is awareness o f some facts, where there is not fact, there is not knowledge. 
Belief is no t so fortunate. It is true that where there is no proposition, there 
is no belief. But all too often the proposition believed is false« (47). In these 
cases Locke thinks we have an obligation to find good reasons for our be­
liefs, a doxastic obligation. W hat turns out however as alone capable of 
m aking reasons »good reasons« is beyond our capacities -  «nobody could 
possibly, for all h e r beliefs, do what is necessary to hold them  for good rea­
son.«20
U nable then  finally to provide a prim a facie criterion for what is to 
count as having »good reason« to believe a particular proposition, Locke 
turns instead to making a proposal for a new way to form one’s beliefs. »Rath­
er than proposing a general criterion of entitled belief,« Wolterstorff holds, 
»Locke was urging a reform  in the doxastic practices of European hum ani­
ty — a new way of using our indigenous belief-forming dispositions. His claim 
was that following his proposed practice amounts to doing one’s best, for 
some proposition, to bring it about that one believes it if and only if it is true. 
And it was his conviction that, for each of us, there are some matters of such 
high ‘concernm ent’ that we are obligated to try seriously to do our best« 
(48). In short, Locke’s response to the cultural anxieties o f his times was to 
propose a radically new picture of which beliefs can be taken as entitled when 
knowledge is so starkly circumscribed.
W olterstorff takes the cardinal passage in Book IV to be xv. 5.This pas­
sage, which I will cite in a m om ent in recapitulation, is about the specific 
nature of this new doxastic practice, of what doing one’s best comes to. The 
passage can be taken as comprising three rules for mediate (not immedi­
ate) beliefs, that is, for doing o n e ’s best in believing a proposition when one 
does not know the corresponding fact. These rules Wolterstorff calls the rule 
o f evidence, the rule of appraisal, and the rule of proportionality. W hen 
applied successively, they run  as follows:
1. The Rule o f Evidence. »Acquire evidence for and against the propo­
sition such that each item of evidence is something that one knows and such 
that the totality is a reliable indicator of the probability of the proposition.«
2. The Rule o f Appraisal. »Examine the evidence one has collected so 
as to determ ine its logical force, until one has ‘perceived’ what, on that ev­
idence, is the probability o f the proposition.«
20 W olterstorff, p. 47; cf. Locke, Book IV. xx. 2.
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3. The Rule of Proportionality. »Adopt a level o f confidence in the 
proposition which is proportioned to its probability, on that evidence« (49).
These rules are taken as the gist o f the key passage m entioned above 
which now can be quoted for comparison:
»the mind if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds 
of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against any 
probable proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it, and upon 
a due balancing of the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less 
firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds 
of probability on one side or the other.«
Thus, Locke’s proposal is a foundationalist procedure for arriving at 
reliable mediate beliefs in matters o f high »concernm ent« to which one is 
rationally entitled. Or, as we noted in W olterstorff’s summary form ulation 
earlier on, a »foundationalist procedure -  for doing o n e ’s best to bring it 
about, for propositions which one does no t know, that one believes them  if 
and only if they are true« (49).21
This reading of Locke’s understanding of reason is no t without serious 
consequences. For while clearly situating Locke in »that long tradition, be­
ginning with Plato, of thinking of Reason as a faculty of awareness, of ap­
prehension, of insight, o f ‘perception,’« W olterstorff is careful to note that 
Locke’s conception of the scope of reason and »the ontological status of its 
objects« is very narrow.
But, however narrow reason’s scope, reason is m ore than procedural 
and instrumental. For, when scrutinized in the contexts o f Book IV, reason, 
as one of the sources of genuine knowledge, allows direct awareness o f ap­
prehension of facts. But, more specifically, the facts reasons apprehends are 
»the logical relations among propositions« (46). This reading is what ena­
21 W olterstorff has modified his form ulations o f these rules in the 1994 paper I cited in 
note 19. There he speaks of »four principles« ra ther than o f »three rules.« For the 
sake of comparison, the »four principles« read as follows:
»Principle of Immediate Belief. One is to believe som ething im m ediately only if it is 
certain for one— that is, only if one knows it« (p. 182).
»Principle of Evidence. One is not to believe som ething mediately until one has acquired 
evidence for it such that each item of evidence is som ething that one knows and such 
that the totality of on e’s evidence is satisfactory« (p. 183).
»Principle of Appraisal: One is not to believe some proposition mediately until, having 
satisfactory evidence, one has exam ined tha t evidence to determ ine its logical force 
and one has ‘seen’ what, on that evidence, is the probability o f the proposition« (p. 
183).
»Principle of Proportionality: Having determ ined the probability, on o n e ’s satisfactory 
evidence, of the proposition in question, one ought to adop t a level o f confidence in 
it which is proportioned to its probability, on tha t evidence« (p. 184).
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bles W olterstorff to retu rn  to the initial quarrels we saw with the Hegel-Tay- 
lor version of the origins of the m odern. W ithout m entioning Taylor Wol­
terstorff clearly has him  in m ind when he states categorically, »those who 
say that Reason, in Locke, is purely procedural, not substantive, cannot have 
read Book IV« (46).
5. Substantive Reason and Doxastic Obligations
W hen we review carefully the details of these two competing accounts, 
we need  to distinguish immediately a series of different issues. Moreover, 
am ong these different issues we also need to specify ju st which considera­
tions are most im portant for our concerns with the emergence in the m od­
ern  era of a particular understanding of the rational nature of interpreta­
tion.
O ne major issue the accounts address is the origins o f the m odern era, 
especially the respective roles of Descartes and Montaigne. The difference 
was a m atter of several generations only, although these generations saw the 
shift from a hum anistic revolution in the work of M ontaigne to a scientific 
one in that of Descartes. H ere, the difference is between the philosophical 
project of Descartes and, again almost two generations later, the philosoph­
ical project of Locke. For Taylor the m odern era begins with Descartes, for 
W olterstorff only with Locke. (In neither case, I would add, is there room 
for Pascal’s general rationality of probability.)
This first issue however comes to something more than simply a disa­
greem ent about where the m odern era begins. For, as we have seen, that 
decision itself seems to be a function of some antecedent notion of what 
constitutes the m odern. For Taylor, what is most characteristic of the mod­
em  era is its implication of at least three different strands in the understand­
ing of what it means to be an individual subject, self, or person.22 And since 
Taylor believes that Descartes disengages the first o f these strands, a new 
understanding of the nature o f the subject, he strongly leans to situating the 
beginning o f the m odern in Descartes’s philosophy.
W olterstorff however has a different understanding of what character­
izes the m odern, especially under the sign of m odern philosophy. For him 
a philosophy begins to be m odern not just when it first polarizes its concerns 
in terms of the subjective, bu t when it articulates its basic philosophical 
project as a response to both individual and societal anxieties about the 
reliability o f basic beliefs. Since, on W olterstorff’s reading, Locke is the first
22 Taylor 1989, pp. 177-78, 185, 305, 308.
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philosopher after the breakdown of the medieval syntheses to structure his 
philosophical project in just this way, Locke’s philosophy and not Descartes’s 
is seen to mark the beginnings of the m odern. This first issue then comes 
down to adjudicating a disagreem ent about the satisfactoriness o f two dif­
ferent bu t equally implicit understandings of the m odern.
But I do not think either Taylor or W olterstorff has given us the requi­
site detail to allow of any satisfactory appreciation o f why they think o f the 
m odern in such different terms. N or is it evident that the notion o f »the 
modern« has the same extension for each one. W olterstorff clearly specifies 
that he takes »the beginnings of the m odern« to refer to »the beginnings 
of m odern philosophy.« Taylor is no t so explicit. At times he seems to take 
the crucial phrase here in the same narrow sense as W olterstorff does; m ore 
often however he seems to have in m ind som ething that includes philoso­
phy but is broader, namely the beginnings of m odern culture. So, even were 
one to have more detail about their respective qualifications for these dif­
ferent antecedent understandings o f »the m odern,« actually deciding be­
tween the two would not clearly be a m atter of deciding between accounts 
of the same thing.
Regardless of these matters, ju st where we situate the beginning of the 
m odern does not bear directly enough yet on our interests here in under­
standing more fully the nature of rational interpretation. For w hether we 
take the m odern era to begin with either Descartes or Locke (or indeed 
following Toulmin with Montaigne or with someone else), we would still have 
to specify ju st which elements of their respective projects are the pertinen t 
ones for elucidating the background understandings of rational in terp re­
tation. So, whatever the respective merits o f each o f these accounts o f the 
origins of the m odern, we have no central interest in trying to explore the 
m atter far enough in order to judge the issue.
A second issue that separates these two accounts however is m ore in­
triguing. This issue has to do with how we are to understand Descartes’s 
philosophical project. For Taylor, this projet turns on a revolutionary con- 
strual of the rational subject which finds its canonical form ulation in M ed­
itation Two, whereas for W olterstorff the Cartesian philosophical project 
turns on refining the late medieval notion o f scientia whose canonical for­
mulation is to be found in the Principles. Descartes’s philosophy for Taylor 
is a new philosophy of rational subjectivity, whereas for W olterstorff Des­
cartes’s philosophy is a transitional philosophy of »science.«
At first glance then it seems we are being asked to decide between com­
peting readings of Descartes’s philosophy. The issue we m ight think comes 
to the now familiar concerns as to w hether we are to read Descartes’s phi­
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losophy of science from  the perspective of his metaphysical and not ju st 
epistemological reflections on the cogito, or, conversely, whether we are to 
read those metaphysical reflections from the perspective of the scientific 
works and, especially, o f the mathematics.
H ere again however I think we need to be circumspect. W olterstorff 
writes from a different standpoint than Taylor. Like Taylor, he has a much 
larger story to tell than ju st the story of how philosophy develops from the 
later medieval period through the Renaissance and into the onset of the 
seventeenth-century scientific revolution. For he carries his story beyond 
Descartes and Locke to Hum e and then on to both Kant and especially Reid 
before he takes up Taylor’s affinities for Hegel (cf. 50-52). More im portant­
ly, as he writes W olterstorff has Taylor’s story before him. Yet W olterstorff’s 
own larger story, while independent of Taylor’s account (cf. his earlier work), 
partly depends on a protracted  critique of Taylor’s reading of Descartes. In 
this sense W olterstorff is offering an alternative account of Descartes to the 
one already before us, namely Taylor’s and of course behind Taylor’s -  and 
this is part o f the great interest in the contrast — to H egel’s own reading.
This peculiar asymmetry I think explains in part some of the differences 
between these two accounts of Descartes. That difference is more finely- 
grained than ju st where o n e ’s reading of Descartes is to start, whether from 
the m athem atical or from  the metaphysical. Rather, the distinction is be­
tween W olterstorff’s attem pts to characterize the rationality of a philosoph­
ical project of Descartes (as he does with Locke) and then judge whether the 
project exhibits what he takes to be characteristic of modernity, and Taylor’s 
attem pt to highlight the new construal of rationality as one only of several 
salient features of Descartes’s philosophical xuork.
W hen viewed from  the standpoint of his philosophical project, Des­
cartes’s philosophy shows both strong continuities and strong discontinui­
ties with later medieval notions of philosophy’s task as scientific. To confirm 
this point we need only underline such central terms in Descartes’s Latin 
writings as »idea.« But when viewed from the standpoint o f Descartes’s met­
aphysical reflections on the nature of the cogito, then Descartes’s work as 
opposed to his philosophical project shows a striking and perhaps revolu­
tionary innovation in what was initially an Augustinian them e of inwardness 
which then filtered through M ontaigne’s neo-Stoical humanism.
This move does no t reconcile the two readings, nor does it try. W hat is 
of concern rather is to see m ore clearly what is the issue that separates these 
two different readings of Descartes. In the light of this recognition that Tay­
lor and W olterstorff are reading from different standpoints, I think we can 
now see that the focus has to be sharpened if we are to appreciate the dif-
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ferences intelligently enough. Regardless then of w hether there are com ­
pelling philosophical arguments available for preferring one standpoint on 
Descartes’s philosophy to another, we have the m ore specific question of 
whether W olterstorff has gotten the description of Descartes’s philosophi­
cal project historically and conceptually right, and whether Taylor has gotten 
the description of Descartes’s notion of the subject right.
Just here it seems to me is where the discussion comes together. For by 
reason of his com m enting on Taylor W olterstorff moves to Taylor’s own 
chosen ground of the cogito and challenges Taylor’s reading of the cogito. 
So the issue now seems to be w hether Taylor’s construal of the cogito as 
comprising a distinctively novel (if no t m odern) understanding o f the ra­
tional subject as self-defining and in that sense autonom ous squares with 
both Descartes’s writings and the conceptual implication of his central claims 
about the rational nature of the cogito.
Yet Wolterstorff does not address this issue as directly as he should. For, 
while agreeing that »the self in general, and the deciding self in particular, 
was moved to the center of attention in early m odern philosophy,« he goes 
on to assert, without direct argum ent, that »the self was not yet the center 
of attention in Descartes’s philosophy, ne ither the volitional self no r any 
other« (56). And of course this leaves Taylor free to underline his concern 
with the rational subject rather than the self, and indeed with Descartes’s 
cogito as implying substantive claims about the subject’s definition o f itself 
as in at least some sense from its place in a network of orderly cosmic rela­
tions. The second issue then, in a similar bu t different way to the first, is no t 
joined. And once again there can be no rush to judgm en t on the »correct­
ness« of the respective accounts of Descartes.
Besides the first issue of where we are to situate the beginnings o f the 
m odern and this second issue of whether Descartes philosophical work if no t 
his project inaugurates in the metaphysics o f the cogito a revolutionary 
understanding of the rational subject as self-defining, a third issue needs 
attention. This issue turns on the details, no t of Descartes’s m odernity or his 
theme of rational subjectivity, but of W olterstorff’s apparent counter-claim 
that »only when we come to Locke does the self occupy center stage,« not 
the autonom ous self but the deciding self, »the idea of the will as central to 
the self« (56; 55).
Suppose, in the light of the considerations that have surfaced in dis­
cussing the first two issues, we set aside the historical claim here that in ear­
ly m odern philosophy the self first comes to center stage in Locke’s philos­
ophy. W hether or no t this is the case -  and we would certainly have to scru­
tinize the implicit distinctions all along between subject and self -  we need
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not investigate. For what is m ore im portant is the complex second claim that 
the self in question here is no t the autonom ous self but the deciding self. 
And specifically what holds our attention is not the fate of the autonom ous 
self and ju st where historically that notion arises. Rather, the key idea here 
is the construal of the deciding self as a self in which the central com ponent 
is the will, what W olterstorff also calls »the volitional self« (57).
O ne im portan t feature  o f this idea is that it arises in the course of 
W olterstorff’s developm ent of his alternate account of the origins of the 
m odern. There is no direct engagem ent here however with Taylor’s read­
ing o f Locke. For Taylor’s reading, as W olterstorff points out repeatedly, 
centers on Book II of the Essay where Locke’s accent falls strongly on the 
nature of knowledge rather than on Book IV where the accent falls on be­
lief. And while W olterstorff certainly wants to reject Taylor’s construal of the 
Lockean self as mainly a punctual self that includes a creating self-defining 
autonomy, he nevertheless is much more interested in detailing his own 
reading of ju st what the Lockean volitional self comprises. Rather than di­
rectly opposing to Taylor’s picture of a Lockean punctual self his own sketch 
o f a Lockean volitional self, W olterstorff is at some pains to show exactly 
where the volitional self fits in his understanding of Locke’s philosophical 
proposal to institute a new doxastic practice.
We recall that W olterstorff takes Locke as »urging the institution of a 
new doxastic practice« rather than »proposing a criterion of entitled belief« 
(48). W hat needs underlin ing  here however is not the idea of a doxastic 
practice whose successive steps require careful formulation in terms of pro­
cedural rules, bu t the associated idea of a doxastic obligation. This notion 
can be seen at work in a passage from Book IV that W olterstorff cites. »He 
that believes, w ithout having any reason for believing, may be in love with 
his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience 
due his maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has 
given him, to keep him ou t of mistake and error...«23
The seeking of truth Locke writes of here is one of those matters of high 
»concernm ent« hum an beings have to worry about. So the first point here 
is the existence of an obligation. But this obligation concerns specifically the 
tru th  of certain matters, a tru th  which requires the use of discernment, a 
non-evident tru th  therefore o f which one cannot have certain knowledge 
in all instances. And hence one which requires the discernment of just which 
of those am ong our beliefs are reliable, a discernment of opinion, of judg­
m ent, of doxa. Thus the obligation here is doxastic obligation. And although
23 Locke, Book IV, xvii, 24; cited in Wolterstorff, p. 47.
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these obligations will vary somewhat, Locke certainly reserves a msyor place 
for moral and religious matters as well as political and educational ones.
Still, what exactly is the nature o f this doxastic obligation? As Wolter­
storff reads Locke, persons have an obligation to go through certain evalu­
ative procedures for testing, supporting, and ensuring the reliability o f ju st 
those moderate beliefs that are central to the issues of »concernment.« Locke 
believes, we rem em ber W olterstorff asserting, that »for each of us there are 
certain issues of such ‘concernm ent’ ... as to place us under obligation to 
try seriously to do our best to bring it about that our beliefs conform  with 
the facts on those issues« (48). W hat the doxastic practice comes to is an 
explicitation, such as W olterstorff’s three rules, of »doing our best.« The 
doxastic obligation concerns the o ther o f the two m ajor com ponents here, 
the »trying seriously.«
This serious trying, I think, is where the idea of the rational self comes 
in as volitional, as having at its core the notion of the will, as deciding. For 
Locke’s doxastic obligation of its nature requires a response. And that re­
sponse for Locke has to be a m atter of the person »trying seriously,« that is 
to say both wanting reliable beliefs and deciding to secure them.
W hat is striking of course is that this wanting and deciding comes to 
constitute the very nature of the Lockean self. But this claim, whatever its 
merits, remains independent of the prior claim that the doxastic practices 
Locke’s philosophical project is designed to elaborate and institutionalize 
themselves derive from doxastic obligations. And these in turn make sense 
for Locke -  given his antecedent Puritan convictions about the existence of 
God, the nature of creation, the obedience hum an beings owe to their cre­
ator, etc. -  only on the assumption that part of what it means to be a ration­
al person in such a context entails wanting and deciding on the securing of 
reliable beliefs about high matters of »concernment.«
In this light we might then construe the third issue that emerges from 
the confrontation of two related but very different accounts of the origins 
of the m odern as whether indeed there is a difference between Wolterstorff’s 
notion o f the Lockean self as primarily a volitional self and Taylor’s notion 
of the Lockean punctual self as a self-deciding-subject. This may be a dis­
tinction without a difference. We see the room  for different emphases here
-  is the Lockean ego mainly a self or a subject? But does Taylor stress the 
»deciding« element in his expression »self-deciding-subject« enough to bring 
the expression’s significance close enough to W olterstorff’s talk of a »voli­
tional self«? If so, then where exactly is the issue? If not, then granted the 
difference; but then, how interesting is this difference philosophically?
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W hether we choose to pursue these matters or not, the third issue here 
about the links between the nature of the rational self, the putative exist­
ence o f doxastic obligations, and the procedures of doxastic practice bring 
us to the most im portant issue for our concerns with the nature of rational 
in terpretation in the m odern  era. That issue turns on the connections be­
tween the understanding  of reason at work in the details of a Lockean dox­
astic practice such as W olterstorff has expanded them, and the understand­
ing o f reason at work in the Lockean account of knowledge such as Taylor 
works out. We recall W olterstorff’s earlier expostulations: »Those who say 
that Reason, in Locke, is purely procedural, not substantive, cannot have 
read Book IV« (46). I turn  to this m atter in the next and concluding sec­
tion.
6. Rationality and Interpretation
Besides the three issues we have been looking at so far, a fourth and 
central issue between Taylor and W olterstorff concerns the nature of rea­
son and rationality at the beginnings of the m odern era. Initially, this issue 
m ight be put in the form of a question. Given the radically influential role 
o f early m odern reflection on the development of Enlightenment, Roman­
tic, and late m odern understandings of interpretation, what are the central 
connections in that reflection among reason, rationality, and interpretation? 
More specifically, how is reason to be understood inside the revolutionary 
Lockean framework of belief?
Very generally, Taylor thinks that the movement of Western philosophy 
from  the Greeks to the early m odern era involves a gradual and thorough­
going change in the understanding of reason. Thus, were we to focus these 
m atters tem porarily on one them e only such as the them e of »self-control,« 
Taylor thinks that we would find »a very profound trans-mutation, all the way 
from the hegem ony of reason as a vision of cosmic order to the notion of a 
punctual disengaged subject exercising instrumental control« (1989: 174). 
T he im portan t po in t to underline in this general view is the opposition 
between reason as a vision and reason as a procedure.
Taylor goes on to make these general comments m ore specific. Thus 
he rem inds us that for both Plato and the Stoics neither introspection nor 
self-examination were im portant for understanding the cosmos and hum an 
goals. The classical ideal was rather a m atter of taking reason as »the cru­
cial capacity ... o f seeing the order -  in the cosmos (for Plato) or in the pri­
ority o f hum an goals (for the Stoics)« (174).
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The m odern ideal in Descartes and especially in Locke, according to 
Taylor, is completely different. For reason is to be understood as a capacity 
for »disengagement and objectification.« And this capacity requires both self- 
examination and introspection. »The m odern ideal,« Taylor writes, »... re­
quires a reflexive stance. We have to turn  inward and become aware of our 
own activity and of the processes which form us. We have to take charge of 
constructing our own representation of the world ... we have to take charge 
of the processes by which associations form  and shape our character and 
outlook« (174-75).
So a m odern  ideal o f reason as reflexively construc ting  an o rd er 
through disengagement and objectification is opposed to a classical ideal 
of reason as non-reflexively seeing an o rder through focus on the essence 
and the substance of things. W here reason on the one m odel provided ac­
cess to the way things are, on the other reason is preem inently an instrument, 
a set of procedures, at the service of a disengaged self.
Taylor’s contrast between the classical and the m odern centers on his 
extended discussions of Locke’s epistemology. We recall that Taylor describes 
that epistemology largely although not exclusively in terms taken from Book
II of the Essay. There Locke proposes that knowledge be understood in the 
contexts o f a radically new picture of the m ind. This picture makes room  
for neither the essences and the forms of things no r for innate ideas of rea­
son. Rather, the Lockean picture is to be taken as a reified and quasi-mecha- 
nistic portrait of the most fundam ental atoms o r elem ents o f m ind. These 
elements are the simple ideas which are the residue of the senses’ »quasi- 
mechanical« impact on the mind. In turn, ou t of these simple ideas com­
plex ideas are then constructed again by a process of association understood 
in quasi-mechanical terms (167). The result is a construction that provides 
a new and reliable representation of both the world and ourselves to replace 
the old and unreliable traditional representations.
The key characteristic of this process, as Taylor expands it, is the inde­
pendent, self-responsible nature of reason, »a notion of reason as free from 
established custom and locally dom inant authority« (167). And although 
Taylor is careful to reserve a place for mathematical truths, deductive knowl­
edge, and even the rules of »probable evidence« in Book IV, he character­
izes the nature o f reason mainly in the contexts o f the atomistic and m ech­
anistic account he describes Locke developing in Book II.
Taylor now identifies this Lockean picture as »the m odern conception 
of reason.« And he summarizes his understanding of this conception with 
the expression »reason is procedural« (168). Reason is procedural in the 
sense that it is neither a seeing nor a com pleting of any independen t order
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of things. Procedural reason is rather a construction of »a picture of things 
following the canon of rational thinking.«
Locke takes these canons differently from  Descartes. Yet for Taylor 
Descartes shares with Locke the modern conviction that following some such 
procedures of reason is the most reliable way of getting as close as we can 
to the way things are. Reason then is construction on the basis of detailed 
canons and procedures for the processes of thinking. A central property of 
these processes is rationality. »Rationality is above all a property of the proc­
ess of thinking, no t of the substantive content of thought« (168).
But, on Taylor’s view, what exactly do these thinking processes comprise 
besides the following of certain canons and procedures? These processes 
comprise a »radically reflexive« procedure that »essentially involves the first- 
person standpoint. It involves,« as we noted earlier, »disengaging from my 
own spontaneous beliefs and syntheses in order to submit them to scruti­
ny« (168). Moreover, these thinking processes also comprise the particular 
constraint that they m ust be carried through independently in the sense of 
being carried through »radically and intransigently exclusive of authority« 
(168). Finally, the aim of these thinking processes is, as we have seen, to 
construct and to rem ake our fundam ental representations, but to do so in 
such a way that the central connections among our ideas »are determ ined 
purely instrumentally, by what will bring the best results, pleasure, or hap­
piness« (171).
In short, Taylor takes the m odern understanding of both reason and 
rationality to arise, whatever the role of Descartes, mainly from Locke’s ar­
ticulation o f reason as preem inently procedural, instrumental, and non­
substantive. And, as we have already noted briefly, Wolterstorff disagrees. The 
question now comes to what exactly is the disagreement about?
I think the disagreem ent is about whether reason and rationality at the 
beginnings o f the m odern era are in any way »substantive.« Taylor says no, 
W olterstorff says yes. But do they disagree about the same thing? To answer 
this question I do not think that we have to m ount a major study o f all the 
nuances that make up the somewhat different Lockean accounts of knowl­
edge and belief in Books II and IV. Rather we need to specify the role of 
reason in the different spheres of knowledge.
Both Taylor and W olterstorff, I take it, share the view that reason is 
»substantive« in the dom ain o f our knowledge of some logical relations, of 
mathem atical truths, and o f deductive truths. For in these different realms 
Locke thinks that reason can be based upon direct awareness. Reason here, 
as W olterstorff writes, is a faculty of direct awareness, »of apprehension, of 
insight, o f ‘percep tion’« (46). So, despite appearances, when Wolterstorff
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goes on to assert very strongly that »those who say that Reason, in Locke, is 
purely procedural, not substantive, cannot have read Book IV,« I d o n ’t think 
either he or we should include Taylor. For while insisting on the preem inent­
ly procedural character of Lockean reason, Taylor does not hold that Lock­
ean reason is »purely« procedural.
This brings us then to the much different -  broader, variegated, and 
difficult -  dom ain of belief. On the basis o f the close exam ination we have 
been conducting here, I think Taylor wants to hold that the practices of 
thinking in the domain of belief when explicitated show Locke’s understand­
ing of reason here, if not in the o ther domains, to be procedural and instru­
mental. Since however even W olterstorff agrees that the ex ten t of this do­
main is very large in Locke’s philosophy as a consequence o f construing 
knowledge so narrowly in terms o f im m ediate direct awareness, one can 
justify the generalisation that Lockean reason is procedural.
W olterstorff on the other hand is most impressed by two things. First, 
that even in the initial construals o f knowledge in Book IV, knowledge is 
defined in terms of both insight and facts. »Let the main point ... no t be 
missed,« he writes; »knowledge is insight; knowledge is awareness, or appre­
hension, o f facts« (46). Reason as a faculty for yielding such insight into facts 
is, at least in this sense, more than procedural; it is substantive.
The nature of these facts may of course be controversial. As W olterstorff 
remarks, »if Plato were to read Locke’s account of the scope and ontologi­
cal status o f the objects of Reason’s awareness, he would feel profoundly 
claustrophobic« (46). Still, Locke’s claim is that reason does m ore than pro­
vide procedures for connecting simple ideas instrum entally; reason also 
provides access to facts.
The second point that strikes W olterstorff is the extent and subtlety of 
the analyses of doxastic procedure in Book IV. Before he gets to attem pting 
an articulation of just what the rules are for m aking our beliefs about mat­
ters of concernm ent reliable, however, W olterstorff acknowledges an im por­
tant distinction in Locke’s account. The distinction is between im m ediate 
and m ediate beliefs. Knowledge for Locke, we rem em ber, is »direct appre­
hension of facts,« whereas belief is »taking some proposition to be true« (47). 
A belief is immediate when one takes some proposition to be true on the 
basis of the accompanying direct apprehension of the fact that corresponds 
to the proposition; otherwise, the belief is m ediate. Locke’s proposal o f a 
new doxastic practice is a way of discharging o n e’s doxastic obligation to 
attend to those cases only where beliefs are mediate; these are cases where 
either belief does not accompany knowledge, or where »the proposition 
believed is false« (47).
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So in those cases where belief does accompany knowledge and where 
belief is im m ediate I d o n ’t think Taylor can have any quarrel with includ­
ing these cases am ong the others as instances being m ore than just proce­
dural. For, ju st as in the cases of our knowledge of logical truths, m athem at­
ical truths, and deductive conclusions, so too here, reason is substantive. 
Reason in each case is a faculty which yields insight into facts.
We arrive then  at the nub  of the disagreem ent -  the Lockean concep­
tion of reason in the most extensive and im portant cases of establishing the 
reliability of o n e ’s m ediate beliefs about matters of high concernm ent. And 
here, once again on the evidence of the extensive details in W olterstorff’s 
account of Locke’s new doxastic practice, I think we have to conclude that 
reason is m ore than procedural and instrumental.
It is true that Locke explicitly says that »the mind if it will proceed ra­
tionally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability...» (IV. iv. 5). And 
W olterstorff himself talks about unravelling »the practice Locke has in mind 
into three rules to be applied in succession« (49). But, as his formulation 
of the rules o f evidence, appraisal, and proportionality explicitly shows, two 
of these form ulations involve knowledge. »Acquire evidence ... such that 
each item of evidence is som ething that one knows... .« And »examine the 
evidence ... until one has ‘perceived« ... .« (49).
Thus we have a foundationalist procedure. But this procedure is clear­
ly directed to establishing »for propositions which one does not know, that 
one believes them  if and only if they are true« (49). Reason then as the fac­
ulty that enables us to arrive at this knowledge, through the practices of this 
new doxastic procedure, is certainly procedural and instrumental in the case 
of mediate beliefs. But reason is also much more -  Lockean reason is also 
substantive.
More generally, we may conclude by saying that rational interpretation 
at the beginnings of the m odern era cannot be construed as procedural and 
instrum ental only. Rather, reflection on the complicated issues at stake in 
two contrasting accounts o f the origins of the m odern shows that an under­
standing of reason as substantive is just as much part of the origin of the 
m odern  as an understand ing  of reason as instrum ental and procedural. 
Construing the rationality o f interpretation in the m odern period then in 
the overly narrow terms of procedural reason is unjustified. To the contra­
ry. O ur understanding of interpretation needs to retrieve the genuine role 
of a substantive construal o f reason if it is to merit any thoughtful claim on 
the nature of m odern interpretation. And that substantive construal must 
make new room  for a much more nuanced account of the complex relations 
holding between certainty, belief, and rationality.
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